Political Accountability of the Commission for its Competition Policy.
Competition policy is an essential component of the internal market and the political economy of the European Union, encompassing a wide array of issues such as the prohibition of anti-competitive behaviour and the review of mergers and State aid. The European Commission is primarily in charge of this policy, much due to the lack of effective legislative, judicial, and administrative constraints. The present Report examines these constraints and proposes the expansion of political accountability before the European Parliament. It does so based on the EU’s constitutional framework for institutional relations and the practical application of competition law.
The Report argues that the Parliament already has constitutional guarantees of the Commission’s political responsibility, namely regarding the consent and resignation of the Commissioner for competition, and should use these to safeguard the importance of interinstitutional dialogue. The Parliament can also intervene judicially with the same purpose. The Report indicates that the Parliament should become particularly involved in policy questions present in enforcement priorities, Commission guidance, and Temporary Frameworks.
In more detail, the Report starts by showing that the Commission’s central role in competition policy is due to its enforcement of open-ended competition rules. It also highlights the power provided to the Commission by the Council to issue block exemptions. This elevates the importance of (unwritten) enforcement priorities and soft law instruments such as guidance and Temporary Frameworks. This is a legitimate dimension of administrative enforcement. However, the Report emphasizes that competition policy is not only technical but contains an important normative dimension. Soft law in particular raises concerns about democratic legitimacy.
Given these concerns, the Report then analyses existing legislative, judicial and administrative constraints that the Commission faces.